RECENT CASES
Agency-Independent Contractor-Salesman Not Employee under Workmen's
Compensation Act-[Utah].-A salesman representing the plaintiff company and another company with a complementary line of goods was killed while returning from a
sales trip. Under the terms of his relationship with the plaintiff company he "[i] was
not specifically limited as to territory ....
[2] received no instructions as to where to
go, when he should go, or how he should conduct his work .... [3] furnished his own
means of transportation .... [and] was given a definite allowance each month."' His
wife was awarded compensation by the industrial commission under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.2 The plaintiff company sought review of the order by the
supreme court, claiming that the evidence did not "support the finding of the commission that the deceased .... was at the time of the accident an employee of the
[plaintiff] .... company." Held, that the salesman had been an independent contractor, and his wife was therefore not entitled to compensation. Order reversed, one
justice dissenting. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Com'n.3
The majority opinion applied the traditional independent contractor tests of "control, .... the nature of the business or occupation; which party furnishes the instrumentalities and tools; the place of work; the time of employment; the method of payment; and the intent of the parties to the contract."4 The dissenting justice, however,
argued that even assuming that the salesman might have been an independent contractor for purposes of the respondeat superior doctrine, he should be deemed an employee under the compensation act. Since that act is designed to facilitate the administration and distribution of risks without regard to fault, the "tests of determination of
x "It appears that the basis on which deceased received compensation for his services was
the amount of his sales, but instead of receiving a strict commission on such sales, he was given
a definite allowance each month. While this allowance was based on the amount of sales made
over a given period, it was nevertheless a specific sum received monthly, irrespective of sales
made during that month." Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 107 P. (2d) 1027, lO28
(Utah 1940).
2 Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933) § 42-1-1.

3 l07

P. (2d)

1027

(Utah i94o).

a discussion of these tests see Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38
Mich. L. Rev. 188 (1939); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 5o (1935); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. J. 584,
595, 602 (1929); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yale L. J. 105 (igi6); 2 Mechem,
Agency § 1g 7 (2d ed. 1914); Tiffany, Agency loo-io5 (2d ed. 1915); Leidy, Salesmen as In4For

dependent Contractors, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 365 (1930); x Shearman and Redfield, Negligence
§ 164 (6th ed. 1913); i Thompson, Negligence § 622 (2d ed. x9oi); see principal case, 107
P. (2d) 1027, 1029 (Utah 194o). But see Baty, Vicarious Liability 147-54 (i916).

s The notion of administration and distribution of risk as a basis for workmen's compensation acts seems to be well recognized. See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 4; Wambaugh, Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 133 (igi); Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation Law i (3d ed. 1917); Bohlen, Casual Employment and Employment outside of Business, 1i Calif. L. Rev. 22i (1923); Laski, op. cit. supra note 4, at 584; Steffen, op. cit. supra
note 4.
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the relationship of employer and employee .... should .... be .... broader than in
the tort field." The justice suggested that the act defines "employee" more broadly,
6
and defines "independent contractor" more narrowly than does the common law, but
apparently he did not deem the language of the statute indispensable to his differentiation between the scope of liability for compensation and for tort. But this differentiation may be dictum: the dissenting opinion may be construed as stating that the salesman should not be treated as an independent contractor even in respect to tort liability, for despite the results of applying the traditional criteria,? the decedent was "an
indispensable link in the plaintiff's business, part of which was selling the goods he
made." 8
A state could provide that the liability of an enterprise for workmen's compensation
should be broader than its liability for the torts of those rendering it service. It would
not violate due process of law to provide that the enterprise should compensate an in9
jured worker who would at common law be considered an independent contractor, so
long as that worker had been rather continuously rendering services to the enterprise.-o
Such a provision might expedite the administration of the workmen's compensation
scheme insofar as there would be fewer business units involved in the compensation
plan. It also would be a means of securing industrial accident insurance" for those
who are only more or less closely associated with the enterprise, and who otherwise
might not take out such insurance. These contractors (whom the common law would
term "independent") would bear the cost of the insurance, since the gross price paid by
the enterprise for their service would presumably be adjusted to include this additional
expense.
In the absence of an express policy of the state to force the extension of accident insurance in this manner, the standard for measuring the scope of the enterprise's liability for workmen's compensation should be identical with the standard for ascertaining the extent of its liability for torts of its contractors X2 The usual justification for
assessing an employer for injuries to his servants is that compensation payments are
6 Utah
8

Rev. Stat. Amn. (i933) §§ 42-1-40-41.

7Note 4 supra.

The justice also feels that the decedent was controlled by the plaintiff company due to its
ability to discharge him at any time. See principal case, I07 P. (2d) 1027, 1031 (Utah 194o).
But see Peters v. California Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 2 P. (2d) 439 (Cal. App. i93i).
9 See Steffen, op. cit. supra note 4, at Si2 n. 49; cf. Freund, Constitutional Status of Workmen's Compensation, 6 IMI.L. Rev. 432 (I912).
1o It may be said that the term "employee," as defined in Utah Rev. Stat. Ann (1933) §42x-4i, suggests this in its limitation of "casual employment."
"x It has been suggested that industrial insurance should not only be the basis for workmen's
compensation but should also be compulsory. See Stevens, op. cit. supra note 4, at 203; Pollock, Torts io5 (6th ed. i9oi); Bohlen, op. cit. supra note S. A state insurance fund is provided
for in Utah (Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (i933) §42-2-X), but the employer may elect one of three
methods of payment of compensation under § 42-1-44.
"2Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 4; Laski, op. cit. supra note 4. Cf. Pollock, op. cit. supra
note ii; Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 235 (,914);
Gravatt v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 14 A. (2d) 143 (Pa. 194o); Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. v. Petty, 282 Ky. 716, 14o S. W. (2d) 397 (194o); Stricker v. Industrial Com'n of Utah,
55 Utah 6o3, i88 Pac. 849 (1920); Otmer v. Perry, 94 N. J. L. 73, io8 Atl. 369 (1919); Litts v.
Risley Lumber Co., 224 N.Y. 321, 120 N.E. 730 (x198).
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costs of the employer's business. Failure correctly to allocate costs might result in
giving firms or industries the operations of which entail relatively great risks competitive advantage over those which make improvements necessary to safeguard the health
and safety of employees. The rationale of the respondeat superior doctrine should likewise be the securing of a correct allocation of business costs. Although historically the
employer's respondeat superior liability was explained by such notions as "possibility
of preventing the injury," "setting the action in motion," and "intrusting the servant
with the instrumentality which caused the harm," these explanations13 were in part
conceived to rationalize the apparent anomaly that the liability of the employer rested
upon the failings of another person over whose tortious conduct he had no effective
control. But when it is recognized that human failure is at the very base of tort liability, and that the enterprise can conduct business only through human agents, there
should be no reluctance to treat payments for torts of servants as a cost of the business
similar to payments to workmen injured while performing their tasks.
The ability to contract freely does not lessen the need for correctly allocating business costs in a competitive society. It may be true that once an employer and a contractor know who is to bear the cost of industrial accident compensation and of the contractor's torts, the parties can adjust the contractor's remuneration so that the net
price of his services will be the same regardless of which party ostensibly bears those
costs. But when a court is called upon to determine whether the contractor or the
enterprise should pay for an industrial accident or an injury to a third party, it will
most likely find that the parties have not reduced their understanding, if any, to an
ascertainable form. In order to allocate correctly the cost, the distribution of which is
being litigated, the court should initially determine whether the relationship between
the employer and the contractor was such that the parties at the time of contracting
for service reasonably should have believed that one or the other was to bear these
business expenses. In the absence of an ascertainable understanding as to the expenses,
the court may presume that if the contractor constitutes a part of the employer's enterprise, the enterprise impliedly consented to assume the costs; contrariwise, if the contractor appeared to be outside of and rather independent of the enterprise.
The court may have to answer the question "cost of whose business?" even where
the enterprise and the contractor agree that the latter should bear the expense of his
industrial accidents and of his tortious conduct. It is probably against the public policy of the workmen's compensation acts for the enterprise to contract to shift the cost
of industrial accidents to one who is not really outside of the structure of the enterprise.X4 And even though the arrangement as to tort liability to a third party may be
enforceable as between the contracting parties, the injured third person need not be
concerned with the understanding. If the tortious contractor were a part of the structure of the enterprise, the third party could proceed against the enterprise. To hold
otherwise would put the loss due to insolvency of the contractor upon the disinterested
13 See the dissent in the principal case, 107 P. (2d) 1027, 1033-38 (Utah i94o); Holmes,
Agency, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (z89x) and 5 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1891); Wigmore, Responsibility
for Tortious Acts, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
14 That is, the enterprise probably cannot contract with an employee to accept a higher
wage and forego the benefits of workmen's compensation. But the enterprise can indirectly
shift the cost of compensation to the employee by paying him a lower wage than it would were
there no compensation scheme.
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third party rather than upon the enterprise which chose to pay the contractor to assume one of its business costs.is
In making the determination as to whether a particular contractor is an employee
of the enterprise or an independent enterpriser, the fundamental question should be
whether the community, given knowledge of the terms of the relationship, would look
upon the contractor as a part of the enterprise. 6 This presumably is the same problem
the contracting parties considered when negotiating the terms of hire. In answering
the question the court or jury should weigh the factors of control, method of remuneration, and the other traditional tests' 7 for determining the existence of an independent
contractor.' 8 These factors, however, are not conclusive but merely indicate the details of the relationship. In the present case, for example, the crucial question is whether in the year 194o a salesman of the type the decedent had been was generally regarded
as "being in business for himself" or as "working for some company or companies."
Arbitration and Award-Defective Statutory Proceeding Upheld as Common Law
Arbitration-General Agreements to Arbitrate Not Contrary to Public Policyp-[innesota].-A construction company's contract to grade a school district's athletic field
provided for arbitration of "all questions subject to arbitration .... at the choice of
either party" and set forth the procedure to be followed "unless otherwise provided by
the controlling statutes."' The company demanded arbitration and appointed its arbitrator. The school district appointed its arbitrator but "reserve[d] the right to object to arbitration" on the ground that "there is no foundation laid for arbitration as so
demanded" and that "the matters are not proper for arbitration."2 Although the
statutory procedure for arbitration was not followed,3 the company brought suit upon
'S This is analogous to the situation where a creditor deals with an agent of a debtor. If the
agent fails to pay over the funds given him by the debtor for that purpose, the creditor may
still proceed against the debtor.
Compare this with the problem that arises when the enterprise knowingly engages an independent contractor who is impecunious. Here the enterprise will be liable for the torts of the
contractor. Presumably the enterprise paid less for the services of the impecunious contractor
than it would have had to pay for the services of a financially sound contractor. The enterprise
would thus secure a competitive advantage if it escaped liability for the contractor's torts.
X6If there is some aspect of the relationship which is peculiar in the sense that it does not
resemble any of the accepted patterns of doing business, the jury might be instructed to ignore
that aspect. This is tantamount to requiring adherence to the "normal" ways of doing business.
If in fact the peculiarities of the relationship are to be overlooked, the crucial question is
whether the community, given general knowledge of the basic pattern of the relationship,
would look upon the contractor as a part of the enterprise.
'7 Note 4 supra.
18The courts use these tests in both workmen's compensation and respondeat superior cases.
Reeves v. Muskogee Cotton Oil Co., 187 Okla. 539, 104 P. (2d) 443 (i94o); Century Indemnity
Co. v. Cames, 138 S. W. (2d) 555 (Tex. Civ. App. i94o); Williams v. City of Wymore, 292
N. W. 726 (lNeb. i94o); Gogoff v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 77 Utah 355, 296 Pac. 229 (1931);
cf. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 71 Utah 395, 266 Pac. 721
(1928); Angel v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 64 Utah io5, 228 Pac. 509 (1924).
2 Ibid., at 7.
' Record, at 2-4.
•3Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §§ 95i3-ig; Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 194o) § 9513. The
arbitration failed to conform to the statute, chiefly because no submission was made naming

